TO: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: BUNCHE

DATE: 14 September 1961

UN NUMBER: D

Dean Rusk phoned from Washington at one thirty this afternoon immediately after having discussed Katanga situation with the President. His upset tone was clearly reflecting White House alarm. I promptly advised him of the report on our operation just out this morning, gave him the gist of it and he suggested that you be advised that views he was expressing were in advance of seeing the report, although he doubted that report would change them in any fundamental way. He specifically and emphatically requested that substance of his remarks be conveyed urgently to you, which are the following five points, each of which I tried, rather vainly, I fear, to counter with facts and reason.

1. President and Rusk "extremely upset" about UN action in Katanga and especially that such an extreme action should be taken without "prior consultation" with Washington, which has given the major support to UN operation in Congo. He expressed view that although USA is not on Advisory Committee because it provides no troops, it ought to be consulted on all such moves.

2. UK is "equally upset".

3. Main basis for concern is "substitution of Gizengist left winger Bocheley for Tshombe in control of Katanga" in what would look like a "conspiracy between UN and Gizenga". Added that if UN operation in Congo led to Communist control, the Congressional reaction would send Dean back to "cotton picking in Georgia".

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4. Urged most strongly that you do everything in your power to "bring Adoula and Tshombe together" and added that solution would seem to be "some kind of federation or confederation".

5. Warned sternly that UN would "lose its support" if Gizenga line dominates in Congo and that Katanga situation is "very dangerous" as regards UN support.

I anticipate your reaction and share it. But they are excited in Washington and badly informed.

Rusk will come to New York Sunday evening.